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Higher commodity price expectations have led to increases in cash lease rates nationwide.  This 
study evaluates the farm level impacts of higher cash lease rates.  Current levels of cash rents 
along with land tenure arrangements of specific farms are instrumental in determining the 
impacts of increases in lease rates. The Farm Level Economic Impacts of Increased Cash Lease Rates 
 
Background: 
The increased demand for corn as a feedstock for ethanol production has had an 
unprecedented effect on commodity markets.  Corn price is at an historical high, and other 
markets are experiencing indirect benefits as a result.  The demand for land in the wake of higher 
commodity prices has translated into historically high prices for crop land.  Although the benefit 
of higher future commodity prices is not yet fully realized, higher price expectations have led to 
increases in cash lease rates.  Inflationary pressures in land markets and increases in cash lease 
rates will have significant impacts on producers’ bottom lines. 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the economic impacts of higher cash lease rates 
for cropland on agricultural producers at the farm level.  A simulation model is used to analyze 
representative farms under various cash lease rates.   
 
Data and Methods: 
This study utilizes primary representative farm data in conjunction with a whole farm 
simulation model to examine the effects of increasing cash lease rates on agricultural producers.  
The representative farms were created through a focus group interview process and are 
maintained and updated through return visits every 2-3 years.  Twelve representative farms 
located in major production regions throughout the Southern United States and the Midwest are 
analyzed under three alternative increases in cash lease rates.  Although many of the 
representative farms represent diversified operations, the farms are classified into commodity 
groups based on the chief source of income.  This study analyzes impacts on four representative cotton farms (Louisiana, Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas), four feed grain farms (Indiana, Iowa, 
South Carolina, and Texas), and four rice farms (Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas).  
The AFPC maintains eleven representative wheat farms; however, they were excluded from this 
study because of the prevalence of share lease arrangements on those operations.  Wheat is 
subject to elevated production risk in much of the United States, and share lease arrangements 
are a common way to alleviate some of the risk experienced by the proprietor.  Although the 
representative farms have unique land ownership and lease arrangements, all farms included in 
the study share the common trait of cash leasing at least a portion of productive acres.  Details of 
land tenure arrangements for each of the representative farms are provided in Table 1.  
Additional attributes of the farms are available in the August 2007 AFPC Baseline Working 
Paper (AFPC 2007).   
A farm level simulation model (FLIPSIM) developed by Richardson and Nixon (1986) at 
Texas A&M University is used to analyze the farms under three percentage increases in cash 
lease rates.  The FLIPSIM model utilizes a multivariate empirical probability distribution for 
simulating stochastic yields and prices, thus allowing projections to incorporate production and 
price risk.  A description of FLIPSIM is available in Richardson and Nixon (1986) and the 
random number simulation procedure is described by Richardson, Klose, and Gray (2000).  Each 
cash lease rate increase scenario was simulated 100 iterations for a 2005 to 2012 study period.  
Average annual projected commodity prices, national average interest rates, rates of change for 
input prices, and rates of change for U.S. land values utilized in the model were obtained from 
the August 2007 Baseline Update reported by FAPRI (2007). 
Three major assumptions were made in this analysis: (1) long-term and intermediate-term 
debt beginning in 2005 is 20 percent of beginning asset value for all crop farms, (2) the provisions of the 2002 farm bill are assumed to continue throughout the projection period, and 
(3) crop mixes and land tenure are held constant throughout the study period. 
The following cash lease scenarios are analyzed and changes are reported relative to the 
Base situation: 
•  Base – Utilized cash lease rates collected at last meeting with the representative farm 
panel and currently used in all AFPC Baseline analyses 
•  25 Percent – Increased current cash lease rates throughout the study period 25 percent 
over the Base 
•  50 Percent – Assumed a 50 percent increase in cash lease rates over the Base for the 
entire study period 
•  100 Percent – Doubled the current cash lease rates experienced in the Base scenario 
 
Results: 
Impacts of increased cash lease rates will be evaluated by examining 2012 ending real net 
worth.  All changes and decreases are reported relative to the Base scenario.  Consistent results 
were found when average net cash farm income and 2012 ending cash reserves were examined, 
so, for space considerations, only the 2012 ending real net worth results are provided (Table 2).  
The farms are classified by commodity type and results are reported based on those categories.  
The farms were also aggregated by farms cash leasing a majority of leased ground and those cash 
leasing less than 50 percent of cropland.  As expected, farms cash leasing the majority of non-
owned land are impacted most adversely.  In addition, those already paying relatively high cash 
lease rates are more vulnerable to these increases.  Farms currently share leasing more land are 
somewhat insulated from increases in cash lease rates.   The large Iowa feed grain farm (IAG3400) experiences the largest decline in real net 
worth of the feed grain farms in actual dollars.  The 25 Percent scenario results in a $385,000 
decline in real net worth by 2012.  A decline of just under $1.7 million results from the 100 
Percent scenario, a 17.7 percent decrease as compared to the Base.  This farm cash leases over 
50 percent of its acres, thus making it vulnerable to these types of increases.  The Uvalde, Texas 
farm (TXUG1200) experiences the greatest percentage of real net worth lost; however, this is 
primarily due to the farm’s poor real net worth of just over $13,000 in the Base situation.   
A 22.1 percent decrease in real net wroth results from the 25 Percent scenario for the 
Louisiana cotton farm (LAC2640).  This farm would actually descend from a positive ending 
real net worth of $991,000 to a negative $56,000 ending real net worth resulting from doubling 
the cash lease rate in the 100 Percent scenario.  This demonstrates the vulnerability of operations 
owning little or no land to any increase in the cost of rental rates. 
In the Base scenario, the Bay City, Texas rice farm (TXBR1800) has a projected 2012 
real net worth of nearly negative $1.2 million.  This is another example of a farm owning no land 
and experiencing a severe decline by any increases in cash lease rates.  By doubling the cash 
lease rate in the 100 Percent scenario, this farm’s 2012 real net worth is reduced another 
$635,000 to negative $1.8 million.  The northern Louisiana farm (LANR2500) loses 
approximately 25 percent of its real net worth as a result of the 100 Percent scenario, a decline 
of just over $800,000. 
When aggregated by farm type, the cotton farms are the most sensitive to increases in 
cash lease rates, experiencing a decline in real net worth of 30.9 percent under the 100 Percent 
scenario.  The feed grain farms are slightly more vulnerable than the rice farms as they experience a 17.7 percent decline in real net worth under the double cash lease rate, while the 
rice farms experience a 16.6 percent decrease in 2012 projected real net worth.   
Finally, the farms were aggregated by those cash leasing greater than 50 percent of rented 
ground versus those that share lease more rented ground results.  As expected, the farms cash 
leasing more land experience greater declines in real net worth as cash lease rates increase.  On 
average, the farms cash leasing the majority of rented ground experienced a 24.2 percent decline 
in real net worth under the 100 Percent scenario, while the group of farms share leasing more 
land only suffered a 16.3 percent decrease in projected 2012 real net worth. 
 
Discussion: 
  Producers in different regions and those producing various commodities face unique 
circumstances and challenges in today’s environment of increasing land rents.  Improved 
commodity markets, resulting at least partially from increased demand for renewable fuels, may 
ultimately benefit landowners more than producers, as landowners will likely adjust cash lease 
rates upward to capitalize on improvements in market conditions.   
Complexities associated with farm bill provisions (such as payment limits) and increasing 
numbers of absentee landowners are just two of the many reasons cited for cash leases gaining in 
popularity throughout the country.  The findings of this study support the idea that the prevalence 
of cash leases has a considerable influence on the overall financial impact of increasing cash 
lease rates.  An interesting topic of future research is to determine price levels needed for 
commodities to completely offset increased cash demands as a result of increasing cash lease 
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 Table 1. Land Tenure Arrangements for AFPC Representative Farms, 2005-2012.
Cash Leased Share Leased Owned Total
--Acres-- --Acres-- --Acres-- --Acres--
Feed Grain
IAG3400 1,913 638 850 3,400
ING2200 1,073 358 770 2,200
SCG3500 2,100 0 1,400 3,500
TXUG1200 1,200 0 0 1,200
Cotton
TXMC1800 405 1,215 180 1,800
GAC2300 1,610 0 690 2,300
TNC1900 1,256 419 225 1,900
LAC2640 1,320 1,320 0 2,640
Rice
TXBR1800 1,800 0 0 1,800
LANR2500 875 375 1,250 2,500
ARHR3000 400 1,600 1,000 3,000
MOWR4000 1,000 1,000 2,000 4,000Table 2. Average Projected Real Net Worth for AFPC Representative Farms Given Alternative Cash
 Lease Rate Increases, 2012.
Base 25 Percent 50 Percent 100 Percent
--$1,000-- --$1,000-- --$1,000-- --$1,000--
Feed Grain
* 5,642.0 5,408.0 5,161.0 4,641.0
IAG3400 7,026.7 6,642.1 6,234.3 5,358.9
ING2200 7,250.8 7,021.4 6,793.4 6,334.4
SCG3500 8,276.4 8,182.4 8,086.7 7,906.8
TXUG1200 13.0 -213.8 -470.6 -1,035.6
Cotton
* 2,512.6 2,352.0 2,178.6 1,736.7
TXMC1800 903.9 867.1 829.2 751.2
GAC2300 4,645.9 4,359.8 4,044.8 3,146.4
TNC1900 3,509.6 3,409.0 3,307.7 3,105.1
LAC2640 990.9 772.0 532.7 -55.8
Rice
* 4,172.0 4,002.6 3,830.0 3,480.0
TXBR1800 -1,179.2 -1,336.6 -1,496.2 -1,814.6
LANR2500 3,207.4 3,008.2 2,808.9 2,405.7
ARHR3000 3,771.7 3,666.5 3,560.9 3,349.1
MOWR4000 10,888.0 10,672.4 10,446.4 9,979.8
Majority Cash Leased 3,878.4 3,671.4 3,451.6 2,941.1
Majority Share Leased 4,339.1 4,170.3 3,994.7 3,630.8
*Average for the four farms aggregated under each commodity classification